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Torts
BY JAYNE MooRE WALDROP*
INTRODUCTION
Several significant tort law cases were decided in Kentucky
during this survey period.' A United States district court applied
Kentucky's newly adopted system of comparative negligence2 in
a manner that, at first glance, blurs the distinction between
contributory and comparative negligence.3 In another decision,
the Kentucky Supreme Court determined the allowable scope of
discovery in libel cases.4 This Survey discusses these cases and
their impact upon Kentucky law.5
I. COmPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
One of the most important recent tort law decisions was
Hilen v. Hays,6 in which the Kentucky Supreme Court discarded
* J.D. Candidate, University of Kentucky, 1986. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the assistance of Prof. Richard C. Ausness in the preparation of this Survey.
The survey period runs from July 6, 1984, through June 30, 1985.
2 See Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Ky. 1984) (judicial adoption of "pure"
comparative negligence). For a detailed discussion of Hilen, see Adams, Kentucky Law
Survey-Torts, 73 Ky. L.J. 481 (1983-84).
Carlotta v. Warner, 601 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ky. 1985).
Lexington Herald-Leader Co. v. Beard, 690 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1984).
Other cases of interest decided during this survey period but not discussed here
include: Sublett v. United States, 688 S.W.2d 328 (Ky. 1985) (Certifying the law, the
Kentucky Supreme Court determined that (1) the United States is an "owner" under
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.190 (Bobbs-Merrill 1970) [hereinafter cited as KRS], which
limits the tort liability of the owner of recreational land open to the public without
charge, (2) the statute is constitutional, and (3) though users of such recreational lands
should not be considered trespassers, neither should they be considered invitees.); Pepsi-
Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc. v. Dean, No. 84-CA-2031-MR (Ky. Ct. App. June 14, 1985)
(no error in jury instruction that omitted language that the product must reach consumer
without substantial change before manufacturer may be held strictly liable for injuries
caused by the product); Williams v. Fulmer, 695 S.W.2d 411, 414 (Ky. 1985) (privity of
contract requirement reaffirmed for products liabilty cases based upon breach of war-
ranty theory).
1 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984).
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the absolute defense of contributory negligence With Hilen,
Kentucky became the forty-second state to adopt the doctrine
of comparative negligence,8 under which damages claimed in a
negligence action are apportioned between the plaintiff and the
defendant according to the fault of each.9
Although the Court apparently opted for a "pure" form
of comparative negligence, 0 it adopted only the portion of
the Uniform Comparative Fault Act" that was "directly ap-
plicable" to Hilen and expressed "no opinion as to future
application of any portion of the [Uniform Comparative Fault]
Act not quoted .. .. ,,2 The adoption of comparative negli-
gence was heralded as an "enlightened" decision,' but Hilen
left many unanswered questions 4 and provided little direction 5
Id. at 719, 720.
For a list of those states that have adopted comparative negligence, see Adams,
supra note 2, at nn.36, 41.
9 See generally V. SCHWARTZ, CoLPARATivE NEGLIGENCE § 1.3 (1974); W. PROSSER
& W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 67 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as
W. PROSSER]; Fleming, Forward: Comparative Negligence at Last-By Judicial Choice,
64 CAL. L. REV. 239 (1976); Keeton, Legal Process in Comparative Negligence Cases,
17 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 1 (1980); Pearson, Apportionment of Losses Under Comparative
Fault Laws-An Analysis of the Alternatives, 40 LA. L. REv. 343 (1979-SO); Prosser,
Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1952-53); Wade, Comparative Negli-
gence-Its Development in the United States and Its Present Status in Louisiana, 40 LA.
L. REV. 299 (1979-80).
,0 673 S.W.2d at 719. See also Adams, supra note 2, at 490. Under "pure"
comparative negligence, the plaintiff's damages are reduced by the amount of negligence
attributed to the plaintiff. For example, if the jury determined that 700% of the plaintiff's
damages were due to his own negligence, then the award would be 30%70 of the total
damages. V. ScnWARTz, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE at § 3.2. There are also several
"modified" comparative negligence systems in which the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant's conduct caused some minimum amount of negligence before the plaintiff
can receive any damages. The fifty percent system is the most popular of these. Under
this system the plaintiff's negligence must be less than the defendant's for the plaintiff
to collect at all. If the plaintiff does collect, his damages are reduced by the percentage
of his negligence. Id. at § 2.1.
1 673 S.W.2d at 720; Uniform Comparative Fault Act § 2, 12 U.L.A. 39 (Cum.
Supp. 1985).
673 S.W.2d at 720.
" Carlotta v. Warner, 601 F. Supp. 749, 755 (E.D. Ky. 1935).
Adams, supra note 2, at 491.
Justice Leibson recognized this problem in his separate concurring opinion. He
wrote:
I concure with the majority opinion. But, in addition I would provide
guidelines for application of the new rule to other situations that will be
1985-86] TORTS
for courts facing unique negligence circumstances. 16
A. Carlotta v. Warner
7
Within six months of Hilen v. Hays,' the United States
District Court for eastern Kentucky considered the effect of
comparative negligence upon a claim quite unlike the one in
Hilen.'9 Carlotta involved a nineteen-year-old apartment lessee's
personal injury action against the complex's owner. 20 The com-
plex included a swimming pool maintained for its tenants' use,
and the complex's management prohibited floating objects in
the pool. On the day of the accident, the plaintiff brought a
large innertube into the pool. 2' While attempting to dive through
the innertube, he struck his head and sustained permanent in-
juries to his nervous system. 22
In his subsequent lawsuit, the plaintiff claimed that the
defendant's negligent enforcement of the pool regulation pro-
hibiting the use of floating objects caused the plaintiff's injuries.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary
affected by the change to comparative negligence. As a general rule, we
do not decide in advance collateral issues which eventually will be forth-
coming. Those issues are resolved later on in the context of concrete cases.
Nevertheless trial courts should have some point of departure for dealing
with the complicated issues that will be precipitated by a change of this
magnitude.
673 S.W.2d at 720.
,, Justice Leibson suggested that the Court adopt the entire Uniform Comparative
Fault Act, along with its official comments, to provide "appropriate guidance where
suitable. Those instances where it is not suitable can be decided on a case by case basis."
Id. at 721. Three states-Washington, Minnesota and Missouri-had at the time of
Hilen judicially adopted the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. Id.
A recent article discussed other "important issues which should be addressed when
comparative negligence is adopted," including apportioning liability among joint tort-
feasors, retaining the doctrine of last clear chance, permitting setoff, and limiting jury
instructions. See Rogers and Shaw, A Comparative Negligence Checklist to Avoid Future
Unnecessary Litigation, 72 Ky. L.J. 25, 27 (1983-84). These topics are outside the scope
of this Survey.
601 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ky. 1985).
673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984).
' For a detailed discussion of the claim in Hilen, see generally Adams, supra note
2, at 485-92.
601 F. Supp. at 750.
2 Id. at 751.
z Id.
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judgment because the plaintiff had been contributorily negligent2
in diving through the tube.24 Although this ruling was made
before Kentucky's adoption of comparative negligence, 25 the case
was still pending on other issues when Hilen was decided. 26 The
plaintiff moved for reconsideration under the new rules of com-
parative negligence.
27
Carlotta involved a situation for which Hilen did not pro-
vide: "that of the slightly negligent defendant versus the pro-
foundly negligent plaintiff. ' 28 The court emphasized that the
plaintiff's claim illustrated a common misconception about com-
parative negligence:
1 Id. Carlotta involved the common law doctrine of assumption of risk, a form
of contributory negligence. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B (1965) states
that assumption of risk is implied when a plaintiff does not expressly agree to assume
a risk, but fully understands the risk of harm and voluntarily chooses to enter or remain
within that area of risk. Kentucky abolished the separate assumption of risk defense in
Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d 586, 592 (Ky. 1967). Other cases that have abolished the
assumption of risk doctrine or merged the doctrine into contributory negligence include
Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1240-41 (Cal. 1975) (assumption of risk is a
variant of contributory negligence); Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287, 293 (Fla. 1977)
(affirmative defense of implied assumption of risk is merged into the defense of con-
tributory negligence); Wilson v. Gordon, 354 A.2d 398, 401-02 (Me. 1976) (comparative
negligence statute abolishes voluntary assumption of risk); Wentz v. Deseth, 221 N.W.2d
101, 104-05 (N.D. 1974) (affirmative defense of assumption of risk is abolished); Farley
v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 758 (Tex. 1975) (voluntary assumption of risk no
longer an issue); Lyons v. Redding Constr. Co., 515 P.2d 821, 826 (Wash. 1973) (limited
retention of assumption of risk as a form of contributory negligence); Brittain v. Booth,
601 P.2d 532, 534 (Wyo. 1979) (assumption of risk as a form of contributory negligence
is a basis for apportionment of fault).
For additional examples of the assumption of risk doctrine's treatment under
comparative negligence systems, see Easterday and Easterday, The Indiana Comparative
Fault Act: How Does it Compare With Other Jurisdictions?, 17 IND. L. REv. 883, 894-
97 (1984).
24 601 F. Supp. at 751.
2, Id. at 750. Before Hilen, contributory negligence was a complete defense in such
cases. Kentucky adopted contributory negligence in Newport News & M.V.R. Co. v.
Dauser, 13 Ky. 734, 734 (1892). 673 S.W.2d at 714. The last reported opinion clearly
rejecting comparative negligence in favor of contributory negligence is Houchin v. Willow
Ave. Realty Co., 453 S.W.2d 560 (Ky. 1970) ("We have not adopted the comparative
negligence doctrine in Kentucky."). For an historical view of contributory negligence in
Kentucky, see 673 S.W.2d at 714-17.
16 601 F. Supp. at 750. The Hilen Court concluded that comparative negligence
should be applied to "all cases tried or retried after the date of filing this opinion"
(July 5, 1984) as well as "all cases pending, including appeals, in which the issue had
been preserved." 673 S.W.2d at 720.
27 601 F. Supp. at 75 1.
2 Id.
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The doctrine of comparative negligence does not mean that
plaintiff is entitled to a recovery in some amount in every
situation in which he can show some negligence of the defend-
ant, however slight. If the plaintiff fails to establish that
defendant's negligent act or omission was a substantial factor
in causing harm to the plaintiff, or if there was a superseding
cause, defendant will not be liable in any amount. 29
The Carlotta court determined that causation doctrines play
an "enhanced" role in comparative negligence jurisdictions,30
especially in those cases in which one party's negligence is slight
in relation to the other party's negligence or to some superseding
cause."1 The court held that the key to a defendant's liability
should be proximate causation, not merely causation-in-fact. 32
Noting the Kentucky Supreme Court's recent commitment to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts approach to proximate causa-
tion,33 the Carlotta court applied the Restatement model. 34
The court agreed that the defendant's failure to enforce the
pool regulation was a cause-in-fact of the accident,3 5 "for if the
innertube had been excluded from the pool the plaintiff could
not have dived through it."'36 In the traditional and Restatement
Id. See also Herman v. Welland Chem. Ltd., 580 F. Supp. 823, 827-29 (M.D.
Pa. 1984) (Proximate causation is a difficult question.); State v. Kaatz, 572 P.2d 775,
780 (Alaska 1977) (failure to foresee negligence of others may be negligence).
601 F. Supp. at 753-54.
Id. at 752-54.
'2 Id. at 754.
Id. at 752. See Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 143-44 (Ky. 1980) (substantial
factor test of proximate cause used to find causation-in-fact). See generally RESTATEiENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 431-32 (1965).
601 F. Supp. at 752.
" Id. at 752-53. Cause-in-fact was determined by applying the "but for" test as
it is stated in REsTATEmNT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 432:
Negligent Conduct as Necessary Antecedent of Harm
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), the actor's negligent conduct is not
a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another if the harm would
have been sustained even if the actor had not been negligent.
(2) If two forces are actively operating, one because of the actor's neg-
ligence, the other not because of any misconduct on his part, and each
itself is sufficient to bring about harm to another, the actor's negligence
may be found to be a substantial factor in bring it about.
In Carlotta, it was obvious that the defendant's failure to enforce the regulation was
the reason the innertube was in the pool. Nevertheless, that negligent act was not
sufficient in itself to bring about the plaintiff's harm. 601 F. Supp. at 755.
601 F. Supp. at 753.
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(Second) of Torts approaches to causation, not only must the
defendant's act be a cause-in-fact, but also it must be a proxi-
mate, or legal, cause of the plaintiff's injuries. 37 The negligent
conduct must be a substantial factor in causing the harm.3
The Carlotta court determined that, as a matter of law,3 9 the
defendant's negligence was "so insignificant as compared to that
of the plaintiff that no recovery should be had despite the
doctrine of comparative negligence." 4 The defendant's negli-
gence was not a substantial factor4' in causing the accident
17 W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 67, at 474; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
431.
1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431, states:
What Constitutes Legal Cause
The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if
(a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and
(b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor of liability because of
the manner in which his negligence has resulted in the harm.
31 601 F. Supp. at 753. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 434, which
states:
It is the function of the court to determine
(a) whether the evidence as to the facts makes an issue upon which the
jury may reasonably differ as to whether the conduct of the defendant has
been a substantial factor in causing harm to the plaintiff....
Kentucky law allows legal cause to be "a mixed question of law and of fact." Deutsch
v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d at 144-45. The determination becomes a matter of law "in some
factual situations [in which] the answer to the question is so beyond difference of
opinion ... " 421 S.W.2d at 593. Accord Mullins v. Bullens, 383 S.W.2d 130, 133 (Ky.
1964) (decedent was negligent to stand on highway at night); Carlisle v. Reeves, 294
S.W.2d 74, 75 (Ky. 1956) (person voluntarily placing himself at risk cannot recover).
40 601 F. Supp. at 753.
41 Id. In determining whether the defendant's act was a substantial factor, the
court relied upon the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 433:
Considerations Important in Determining Whether Negligent Conduct is
Substantial Factor in Producing Harm.
The following considerations are in themselves or in combination with
one another important in determining whether the actor's conduct is a
substantial factor in bringing about harm to another:
(a) the number of other factors which contribute in producing the
harm and the extent of the effect which they have in producing it;
(b) whether the actor's conduct has created a force or series of forces
which are in continuous and active operation up to the time of the
harm, or has created a situation harmless unless acted upon by other
forces for which the actor is not responsible;
(c) lapse of time. (Emphasis by court).
See 601 F. Supp. at 752. The court also relied upon RESrATEUMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS
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because several other factors also produced the harm, 42 includ-
ing:
(1) The plaintiffs negligence was active, the defendant's pas-
sive .
41
(2) The plaintiff's act was deliberate, the defendant's inad-
vertent.
(3) The plaintiff was a knowledgeable adult, not a minor or
other person to whom the defendant owed a special duty.
(4) There was no risk until the plaintiff created it.
(5) The only negligence of defendant was in failing to prevent
plaintiff from injuring himself.44
§ 433 Comment d, which reads in part:
Some other event which is a contributing factor in producing the harm
may have such a predominant effect in bringing it about as to make the
effect of the actor's negligence insignificant and, therefore, to prevent it
from being a substantial factor.
See 601 F. Supp. at 753.
42 601 F. Supp. at 755-56. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433(a).
41 Using the terms active and passive negligence to distinguish the acts of negligent
parties was strongly criticized in State v. Kaatz, 572 P.2d at 785. Kaatz criticized
"[i]ntroducing various standards and concepts from other areas of tort law and creating
from them rigid rules to be used in comparing negligence." Id. Such practice destroys
one of the "virtues" of comparative negligence-its "greater flexibility." Id. On the
issue of flexibility, see V. ScHw Ruz, supra note 9, at § 21.2. Nevertheless, the Carlotta
court's use of the active/passive distinction in substantial factor analysis was based upon
Kentucky law, which allows a passively negligent defendant to have indemnity from an
actively negligent defendant when both are found to be liable.
Where one of two parties does an act or creates a hazard and the other,
while not concurrently joining in the act, is, nevertheless, thereby exposed
to liability to the person injured, or was only technically or constructively
at fault, as from the failure to perform some legal duty of inspection and
remedying the hazard, the party who was the active wrongdoer or primarily
negligent can be compelled to make good to the other any loss he sustained.
Brown Hotel Co. v. Pittsburgh Fuel Co., 224 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Ky. 1949) (suit for
indemnity), reaffirmed in Burrell v. Electric Plant Bd., 676 S.W.2d 231, 236 (Ky. 1984)
(subsequent to Hilen). The Carlotta court found that, whenever a passive/active negli-
gence distinction can be made, "[t]here is a powerful thrust toward finding that the
passively negligent party's negligence is not a substantial factor of the actively negligent
party's injury." 601 F. Supp. at 754 n.15.
" 601 F. Supp. at 755-56. These factors are not to be considered all inclusive, but
"merely ... useful guidelines." Id. at 756.
TORTS
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The court found that the plaintiff's negligence was the sole
proximate cause of the harm he suffered.4 5 The concept of sole
proximate cause is certain to become an important issue in
Kentucky's comparative negligence system.
B. Sole Proximate Cause in a "Pure" Comparative
Negligence System
For years Kentucky has recognized the doctrine of sole prox-
imate cause in cases involving the overwhelming negligence of
one party and the slight negligence of another.4 Even under the
harsh rule of contributory negligence, a plaintiff could use the
sole proximate cause doctrine to gain relief from the effect of
his own negligence.47 In Lee v. Dutli,4 the Kentucky Court of
Appeals held that a defendant who backed his car, which had
fogged windows, into the plaintiff's car was the sole proximate
cause of the accident. 49 The defendant claimed that the plaintiff
was contributorily negligent by parking in a restricted area.50
The Court found that the question of plaintiff's contributory
negligence should not have been submitted to the jury.5' Thus,
the plaintiff's contributory negligence, although a cause-in-fact
in the "but for ' 5 2 sense, did not bar his claim. 3 The court
stated:
[T]he negligence of [the defendant] in getting into his auto-
mobile with the windows fogged up and backing 35 or 40 feet
was the sole proximate cause of the accident; that it is equally
clear that if there was any negligence on the part of [plaintiff]
in parking outside the marked area, it had no proximate causal
connection with the accident. .... 54
41 Id. at 754-55.
46 See, e.g., Lee v. Dutli, 403 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Ky. 1966); Lawhorn v. Holloway,
346 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Ky. 1961) (seventeen-year-old driver lost control and struck parked
car).
7 Carlotta v. Warner, 601 F. Supp. at 754 n.16 and accompanying text.
4- 403 S.W.2d 703 (Ky. 1966).
49 Id. at 704-05.
10 Id. at 705.
51 Id.
52 For an explanation of the "but for" test, see note 35 supra.
403 S.W.2d at 705.
Id. at 704-05 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 74
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The sole proximate cause doctrine, although applied under
the old law of contributory negligence 5- remains a viable concept
in comparative negligence systems. Several commentators have
suggested that it is the best approach to a case in which there is
both an overwhelmingly negligent party and a slightly negligent
party.
5 6
The historical justification for the contributory negligence
defense has been that the "plaintiff should not recover when his
negligence is the 'proximate cause' of the accident. 57 Much of
the dissatisfaction with the defense, however, stemmed from
placing "upon one party the entire burden of a loss for which
two are, by hypothesis, responsible." 5 8 Courts developed make-
shift doctrines, such as last clear chance,5 9 while attempting to
ameliorate the harshness of the contributory negligence defense,60
particularly when the plaintiff's negligence was slight in relation
to the defendant's overwhelming negligence.6 ' Courts and juries
became reluctant to hold the slightly negligent plaintiff liable.
62
Theoretically, pure comparative negligence allows a plain-
tiff's recovery for damages attributable to the defendant's neg-
ligence "regardless of the extent to which either party's negligence
contributed to the plaintiff's harm. ' 63 Courts have allowed re-
covery in amounts ranging from minuscule to total recovery.64
Pure comparative negligence has been hailed as a simple, equi-
table form of recovery65 and has been endorsed by several leading
commentators. 66 It also is the form employed by the Uniform
See V. SCHrWARTZ, supra note 9, § 4.4, at 88.
See id. at 91-92. Nevertheless, Schwartz also thinks that "sole proximate cause"
can eviscerate pure comparative negligence, id. at 89.
11 V. Scn-WARz, supra note 9, § 4.4, at 88. See also Annot., 78 A.L.R.3D 339,
345 (1977).
W . PROSSER, supra note 9, § 67, at 468-69.
' Id. at 469.
' Id.; Annot., supra note 57, at 345.
' d. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 67, at 469.
I.21d.
r. Annot., supra note 57, at 347.
Godfrey v. State, 530 P.2d 630, 633 (Wash. 1975) (automobile accident).
V' . ScmvATz, supra note 9, § 3.2, at 46; W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 471-73.
V-' v. ScHwARTZ, supra note 9, § 21.3, at 342; Fleming, supra note 9, at 246-50;
Keeton, Comment on Maki v. Frelk-Comparative v. Contributory Negligence: Should




Whereas contributory negligence systems adopted such fair-
ness doctrines as last clear chance to protect the slightly negligent
plaintiff, comparative negligence systems have adopted the sole
proximate cause doctrine to protect the slightly negligent defen-
dant." While some courts are willing to extend the traditional
rules of proximate cause and allow recovery against a slightly
negligent defendant, 69 others have been reluctant to do so. 70
Instead, where one party's negligence approaches one hundred
percent of the fault, courts have held that the party's conduct
was the harm's sole proximate cause. 7' A defendant may avoid
any apportionment of fault by using the sole proximate cause
argument, 72 or by arguing that his acts were not a cause-in-fact
of the accident.73
The slightly negligent defendant problem seldom arises in
modified comparative negligence systems because, in comparing
fault, the plaintiff's fault must be no greater than the defen-
dant's. For a plaintiff to recover under the slight/gross modified
comparative negligence system, the plaintiff's fault must be no
greater than slight, while the defendant's fault must be gross.
In the fifty percent modified system, the plaintiff, to recover,
must bear no more than half of the fault. In both systems the
ultimate recovery is equal to the plaintiff's damages less the
percentage of fault attributed to the plaintiff.74
" See note 11 supra. See also Wade, A Uniform Comparative Fault Act- What
Should It Provide? 10 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 220, 223-35 (1976-77) (written by principal
draftsman of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act).
" W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 67, at 475; V. ScI wARrz, supra note 9, § 4.4, at
91-92.
69 W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 67, at 474. See, e.g., Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach
City School District, 585 P.2d 851, 852, 858-60 (Cal. 1978) (ten-year-old student/truant
struck by motorcycle after leaving school grounds without permission).
" See, e.g., Korbelik v. Johnson, 227 N.W.2d 21, 24 (Neb. 1975) (darting child);
Kroon v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 628 F.2d 891, 894 (5th Cir. 1980) (airplane accident).
W . PROSSER, supra note 9, § 67, at 475.
7 See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Smith, 140 So. 2d 856, 858 (Miss. 1962) (collision
caused by car crossing in front of oncoming train); Green v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R.,
141 So. 2d 216 (Miss. 1962) (car collided with train blocking crossing).
1, See, e.g., New Orleans & N.E. R.R. v. Dixie Highway Express, Inc., 92 So. 2d
455, 456 (Miss. 1957) (train and truck collided at crossing).
74 See H. WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT §§ 4:3-4:5 (1978).
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The sole proximate cause doctrine introduces a similar
threshold of comparative "innocence" over which the plaintiff
must pass before collecting. If the defendant's actions are so
slight as to be an insubstantial factor, then the plaintiff's actions
are deemed the sole proximate cause of the damage. Thus a jury
must reduce the damage award in proportion to the negligence
attributable to the plaintiff "unless the plaintiff's negligence was
the sole proximate cause of harm that befell him."' 75 In rare
instances, as in Carlotta, the court may find the plaintiff's
conduct so overwhelmingly negligent that, as a matter of law,
reasonable minds could not differ on causation. 76 Thus the plain-
tiff will recover nothing-just as the plaintiff who is fifty-one
percent at fault will come away empty-handed in a modified
comparative negligence system.
77
C. The Future of Comparative Negligence
The Carlotta court's approach is sound for several reasons.
First, Hilen v. Hayes7 requires that the substantial factor test
be used in determining causation.
The trier of fact must consider both negligence and causation
in arriving at the proportion that negligence and causation
attributable to the claimant bears to the total negligence that
was a substantial factor in causing the damages.
7 9
Thus the Hilen Court intended to follow the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts approach, which requires finding that an act was
a "substantial factor" in causing the harm before apportioning
" V. ScHswArz, supra note 9, § 3.2, at 46. See also Annot., supra note 57, at
366; Camurati v. Sutton, 342 S.W.2d 732, 738 (Tenn. 1960) (no jury question when all
negligence was the plaintiff's); Stewart v. Kroger Grocery, 21 So. 2d 912, 914 (Miss.
1945) (using instrumentality in improper way can be entire causation); Mississippi Export
R.R. v. Summers, 11 So. 2d 429, 430 (Miss. 1943) (plaintiff's negligence was "sole
proximate cause" of his death).
16 601 F. Supp. at 753, 755. See, e.g., Vanderweyst v. Langford, 228 N.W.2d 271,
272 ("where the evidence is so clear and conclusive as to leave no room for differences
of opinion among reasonable men ... the issue of causation becomes one of law to be
decided by the court").
" See H. WooDs, supra note 74 at § 4:3.
7 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984).
' Id. at 720 (emphasis added).
TORTS
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damages. 0 If an act is not a substantial factor in causing the
harm, damages will be either reduced or not awarded, depending
upon whether the plaintiff's or the defendant's act fails to be a
substantial factor. 81
Second, the court's application of the sole proximate cause
doctrine does not conflict with Kentucky precedent 82 or the
theoretical underpinnings of pure comparative negligence.8
3
Comparative negligence has been praised as a fundamentally fair
system because of its basic premise: "the extent of fault should
govern the extent of liability.' '84 But just as contributory negli-
gence fell into disfavor because of its harshness to plaintiffs, 5
comparative negligence could unfairly punish slightly negligent
defendants. Courts often have narrowed the definition of con-
tributory negligence 6 to protect slightly negligent plaintiffs. The
sole proximate cause doctrine or other refinements in defining
causation may be the best method of limiting a defendant's
liability when the plaintiff is overwhelmingly negligent.8 7 The
doctrine also allows a slightly negligent plaintiff to recover one
hundred percent of his damages when the defendant's acts are
held to be the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. 8
Thus, the doctrine provides an additional element of fairness to
a pure system of comparative negligence.8 9
Nev6rtheless, the sole proximate cause doctrine must be ap-
plied with caution and only in such rare cases as Carlotta.90
0 For a discussion of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS approach to causation,
see notes 35-42 supra and accompanying text.
, See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
8 For a discussion of the sole proximate cause doctrine under the prior Kentucky
law of contributory negligence, see notes 46-54 supra and accompanying text.
11 See notes 55-77 supra and accompanying text.
Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d at 1231.
Ws illiams and Davidson, Kaatz v. State: The Rule of Comparative Negligence
Afloat Upon Uncharted Alaskan Waters, 6 UCLA - ALASKA L. Rv. 175, 180 (1977).
16 James, Contributory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691, 731-33 (1952-53).
9, Carlotta v. Warner, 601 F. Supp. at 755; V. ScHwxArTz, supra note 9, § 4.4, at
91-92.
" W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 67, at 472 n.37, at 475 n.56.
89 Id.
1o 601 F. Supp. 749. "[T]he use of sole proximate cause remains viable under
comparative negligence, although it will be a rare case where the comparative fault is




Although the doctrine avoids "placing liability upon a defendant
whose responsibility for the occurrence was extremely limited," 9'
it could "eviscerate a comparative negligence system.''92 Even
those scholars who recognize the doctrine's value warn of its
implications.
[T]he linkage between "proximate cause" and contributory
negligence can be a potential demon .... Even in cases where
there are other contributing causes, a court may say that
plaintiff's claim is barred because his negligence was the "sole
proximate cause" of the accident. In effect, the contributory
negligence defense returns under a different name.93
There are countless unanswered questions concerning Ken-
tucky's comparative negligence system. As Justice Leibson rec-
ommended in his concurring opinion in Hilen,94 adopting the
entire Uniform Comparative Fault Act9 would give trial courts
and lawyers a more solid foundation for negligence litigation.
96
The Uniform Comparative Fault Act is considered superior to
any existing system of comparative negligence 97 because it re-
duces "complicated legal theories regarding types and degrees
of fault to relatively simple factual determinations." 98
II. DEFAMATION
A. Scope of Discovery in Libel Cases
Since the landmark libel decision New York Times v. Sulli-
van,99 courts have struggled with the conflict between the first
91 V. SCHXVARTZ, supra note 9, § 4.4, at 91-92.
91 Id. at 89.
9, Id.
' 673 S.W.2d at 720. See also notes 15-16 supra and accompanying text.
91 673 S.W.2d at 720. See also note 11 supra and accompanying text.
" 673 S.W.2d at 721. Justice Leibson stated that "trial courts should have some
point of departure for dealing with the complicated issues that will be precipitated by a
change of this magnitude." Id. at 720.
97 H. WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT § 22.12 (1978).
13 673 S.W.2d at 721. Justice Leibson wrote:
Three states, Washington, Minnesota, and now Missouri, have already
gone to the Uniform Act as a model. If there can be an advantage to our
being among the last to adopt comparative negligence, it should be the
advantage of being able to use the broad experience provided by our
predecessors to point the way to the best solutions available.
Id.
, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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amendment guarantee of an "uninhibited, robust, and wide
open ' ' 0" press and "the protection of private reputational inter-
ests" under defamation laws.' 0' The Sullivan Court balanced
private reputational interests against first amendment rights by
requiring proof of actual malice. 0 2 In Lexington Herald-Leader
v. Beard,'0 3 the Kentucky Supreme Court tried to balance these
two interests to determine the proper scope of discovery.
1. Lexington Herald-Leader v. Beard
Beard addressed the scope of discovery that is properly al-
lowed in libel cases. The plaintiffs were thirteen former employ-
ees of the University of Kentucky's Tobacco and Health Institute
who sued the defendant newspaper, claiming that the newspaper
had printed false and defamatory statements about them.' °4 Dur-
ing discovery, the plaintiffs served a subpoena duces tecum on
three reporters, requesting all of the materials acquired during
the newspaper articles' preparation. 0  The newspaper moved to
quash the subpoena, alleging that the information was "nondis-
coverable, at this time, by virtue of the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution and KRS 421.100. 'b06
m' Id. at 270.
30, Note, Self-Censorship After Herbert v. Lando: The Need for Special Pre-Trial
Procedure in Defamation Action, 58 N.C.L. REv. 1025, 1025 (1979-80).
302 376 U.S. at 279-80. The Court defined actual malice as "knowledge that [the
statement] was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at
280. "Actual malice" is more closely related to "scienter" than to the old common law
"ill will". NowAK, ROTUNDA, & YOUNG, CONSTrruTIONAL LAw (1983), at 946 [hereinafter
cited as NowAK]. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 111, at 771-72.
-0 690 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1984), reh'g denied, 690 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1985).
'1- Id. at 375.
10 Id. The subpoena directed the reporters to produce at the deposition:
all documents of whatever nature relating to the matters in controversy
herein, including but not limited to any memoranda of interviews, records
of people interviewed, notes of whatever nature, memoranda of phone
calls, reports of independent agencies, and any and all other materials
acquired during the course of investigation or preparation of the newspaper
stories referred to in the complaint.
Id.
I, Id. KRS § 421.100 (Bobbs-Merrill 1981) is Kentucky's shield law for reporters.
It states:
No person shall be compelled to disclose in any legal proceeding or trial
before any court, or before any grand or petit jury, or before the presiding
[Vol. 74
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The trial court denied the motion to quash, but issued a
protective order that allowed the newspaper to supply "copies
of the reporters' notes in lieu of the original."' 0 7 In addition,
the newspaper was permitted "to delete from the copies ...
such portions of the notes as refer solely to matters other than
the issues raised by the allegations of the complaint."' 0 The
newspaper was entitled to a further hearing if there were "any
doubt as to whether material should or should not be deleted.'
9
The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the substantive valid-
ity of the trial court's discovery order,"l0 analogizing the present
need for discovery to another Kentucky case,"' Nazareth Liter-
ary & Benevolent Institution v. Stephenson." 2 There, the Court
held that a hospital was required to answer a discovery order
involving physicians' statements about a colleague made to an
internal review committee." 3 The hospital had claimed a com-
mon-law privilege against disclosing the information, stating that
there was an overriding public interest in providing a confidential
review procedure for correcting mistakes in hospital or staff
practices." 4 The Court, however, found no common-law or sta-
tutory privilege for such matters and refused to create such an
"impediment to the discovery of truth."" 5 Also, the Court held
that "parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
officer of any tribunal, or his agent or agents, or before the general
assembly, or any committee thereof, or before any city or county legislative
body, or any committee thereof, or elsewhere, the source of any infor-
mation procured or obtained by him, and published in a newspaper or by
a radio or television broadcasting station by which he is engaged or
employed, or with which he is connected.
,'l 690 S.W.2d at 375.
' Id.
'a" Id.
' Id. at 379-80. On review by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, the case was
dismissed on procedural grounds because an order granting a subpoena duces tecum is
purely interlocutory and is not appealable. Id. at 375. See Claussner Hosiery Co. v. City
of Paducah, 120 S.W.2d 1039 (Ky. 1938). Nevertheless, the Kentucky Supreme Court
granted discretionary review "because of the importance of underlying considerations in
this case involving the scope of freedom of the press." 690 S.W.2d at 376.
690 S.W.2d at 376-77.
503 S.W.2d 177 (Ky. 1973).
Id. at 179.
"1 Id. at 178-79.
"I Id. at 179.
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privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in
the pending action."
1" 6
The Beard Court followed these rules of discovery and priv-
ilege. It found that the information contained in the requested
material was not privileged under common or statutory law,"17
and was relevant to the libel suit's subject matter. To. establish
liability, the plaintiffs had to prove the newspaper's negligence
or reckless disregard for the truth." 8 As is typical in such cases," 9
the Court recognized that "[t]he information in the possession
of the newspaper at the time of publication is critical"1 20 in
proving negligence or actual malice.' 2' The Court also protected
the reporters' confidential sources by allowing the newspaper to
delete the sources' names from the requested materials.'2
By allowing deletion of the sources' names, the Court rec-
ognized the statutory privilege embodied in Kentucky's shield
law, which requires the disclosure of confidential information
but not the source from which it was obtained.' 23 In so doing,
,,6 Id. (citing Ky. R. Civ. P. 26.02) (emphasis added).
"' 690 S.W.2d at 377.
"' Id. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342, 345, 349-50 (1974)
(plaintiff who is not a public official or figure may collect actual damages upon proof
of negligence; actual malice not required in cases involving private plaintiffs).
"I See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 160 (1979) (freedom of press does
not bar plaintiff's inquiry into editorial process); Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 636-37
(D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974).
12o 690 S.W.2d at 377.
121 Id. See also Now~AK, supra note 102, at 914. See generally Annot., 99 A.L.R.
3D 37 (1980).
" 690 S.W.2d at 377-78.
113 Id. at 378. See KRS § 421.100. There are other situations involving claims of
"newsgatherers privilege." Some involve civil or administrative actions in which a
nonparty journalist is called as a witness. See, e.g., Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 714-
15 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (first amendment interest outweighed compelled disclosure); Riley
v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 716 (3d Cir. 1979) (disclosure depends upon need for
sources); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 438 (10th Cir. 1977) (must
demonstrate need for evidence before it is required); United States v. Steelhammer, 539
F.2d 373, 375 (4th Cir. 1976) (reporter not in contempt if information can be obtained
from other sources), reh'g en banc, 561 F.2d 539 (4th Cir. 1977); Baker v. F & F
Investment, 470 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1972) (disclosure must be essential to public
interest or orderly administration of justice), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Demo-
cratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394, 1396-98 (D.D.C. 1973) (must first
exhaust alternative source of evidence); Winegard v. Oxberger, 258 N.W.2d 847, 852
(Iowa 1977) (standards for subordinating nevsperson's privilege), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
1985-861 TORTS
the Court extended to discovery requests 124 the holdings of a
landmark United States Supreme Court case that originated in
Kentucky-Branzburg v. Hayes'25 and Branzburg v. Meigs,2 6 a
related case that was decided by the Kentucky high court.
B. Basis for the Privilege
Although the Beard Court stated that it would not impose
rules by which discovery in libel cases would be governed, 27 it
actually based its decision upon rules commonly used by other
courts. A trial court must weigh, on a case-by-case basis, "the
competing interests of a litigant's right to disclosure with due
regard for the importance of freedom of the press.' ' 28 Thus, as
905 (1978).
Other cases have involved libel actions against newsgatherers who refused to identify
news sources at trial. See, e.g., Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633
F.2d 583, 597-98 (Ist Cir. 1980) (court must weigh plaintiff's need to know against
defendant's need to preserve confidentiality); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621
F.2d 721, 725-27 (5th Cir. 1980) (court should compel discovery if necessary to establish
malice), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981); Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 636-37 (D.C.
Cir.) (newsperson directed to reveal source), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 938 (1974); Cervantes
v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 993-95 (8th Cir. 1972) (no compulsory revelation when
publication in good faith), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); Mize v. McGraw-Hill,
Inc., 86 F.R.D. 1, 4 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (no disclosure unless other sources exhausted);
Mitchell v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 625, 632, 634 (Cal. 1984) (scope of privilege
depends in part upon whether reporter is a party to the suit); Jamerson v. Anderson
Newspapers, Inc., 469 N.E.2d 1243, 1246 (Ind. App. 1984) (Indiana statute confers
absolute privilege upon news media); Dow Jones & Co. v. Superior Court, 303 N.E.2d
847 (Mass. 1973) (party to suit must reveal source related to central, factual issue); CBS,
Inc. v. Campbell, 645 S.W.2d 30, 33 (Mo. App. 1982) (videotapes including "out takes"
must be produced); Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 445 A.2d 376, 382-83 (N.J. 1982)
(New Jersey statute gives newspersons absolute privilege).
The issue of newsgatherers' privilege within the criminal law setting is outside the
scope of this Survey. See generally Annot., supra note 121, at 60.
1-" 690 S.W.2d at 379-80. For several different views on the Branzburg v. Hayes
decision, see Note, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HAv. L. REv. 52, 137-48 (1972-
73); Comment, Branzburg v. Hayes: A Need for Statutory Protection of News Sources,
61 Ky. L.J. 551 (1972-73) [hereinafter cited as News Sources]; Comment, The Newsman's
Privilege After Branzburg: The Case for a Federal Shield Law, 24 U.C.L.A. L. Rav.
160 (1976-77).
-' Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1971) (newsperson must reveal
information to grand jury), aff'd, sub nom Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
'Z 503 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. 1971) (newsperson required to appear before grand jury
when subpoenaed).
127 690 S.W.2d at 379 (quoting Justice White in Branzburg v. Hayes).
123 Id.
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in Beard, the trial court must fashion "a protective order suitable
to the circumstances. 1' 29 The Court also stated that "discovery
[would be allowed] of information relevant and material to the
issues."' 30 In addition, the Court recognized that the information
was not available from alternative sources.1
3'
The "relevant, material, and no alternative" approach has
deep-rooted constitutional and statutory foundations. It is within
the liberal interpretation of Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure
26132 and incorporates the rulings of several landmark first
amendment cases. 33 The Court followed a route taken by mod-
erate courts who choose "to accommodate the needs of both
plaintiffs and of defendants; or at least to assure that the clash
between them does not occur unless and until it must.' 34
One of Beard's roots is Branzburg v. Hayes,35 in which the
United States Supreme Court refused to find a first amendment
privilege allowing a reporter to withhold the identity of a con-
fidential source during grand jury questioning. 36 As Mr. Justice
White wrote: "[T]he consequential, but uncertain, burden on
news gathering"' 37 created by compelling reporters to testify
before grand juries is outweighed by the societal interest in
controlling criminal behavior. 38 Although Branzburg involved a
grand jury investigation of a criminal act, it indicated that civil
cases would be treated similarly.
It is clear that the First Amendment does not invalidate every
incidental burdening of the press that may result from the
enforcement of civil or criminal statutes of general applicabil-
ity .... [O]therwise valid laws serving substantial public inter-
ests may be enforced against the press as against others, despite
,4 Id.
I d. (emphasis added).
131 Id.
See KY. R. Civ. P. 26.
,4 See, e.g., Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d at 345; Branzburg v. Meigs, 503
S.W.2d at 748.
"4 Sack, Special Discovery Problems in Media Cases, 6 LITIGATION 21, 23 (Summer,
1980).
408 U.S. at 665.
Id. at 708.




the possible burden that may be imposed. . . . "The publisher
of a newspaper has no special immunity from the application
of general laws. He has no special privilege to invade the rights
and liberties of others."' 3 9
The Beard court'40 also based its decision upon the holding
in Garland v. Torre,'4 1 in which actress Judy Garland sued CBS
for an allegedly defamatory statement contained in an article
written by columnist Marie Torre and attributed to a confidential
source. At the deposition, Torre refused to name her source,
claiming a first amendment privilege to withhold confidential
material from public disclosure in a civil suit. 42 The privilege
argument was rejected, and Torre was jailed for contempt.
143
Judge (later Mr. Justice) Stewart wrote in Garland that neither
the first amendment nor an evidentiary privilege justified the
columnist's refusal to reveal her source's identity.'44 The Garland
court developed a three-step analysis' 45 that was impliedly em-
ployed in Beard. Under this approach, disclosure is required if
(1) the information was not patently frivolous (was material), 46
(2) reasonable efforts to obtain the information were not suc-
cessful (no alternative source),'147 and (3) the information was
relevant because it "went to the heart of the plaintiff's claim.'
' 48
" Id. at 682-83 (quoting Assoc. Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937))
(emphasis added).
690 S.W.2d at 379.
' 259 F.2d 545 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
141 259 F.2d at 547-48.
141 Id. at 547 n.2.
I" Id. at 549-50. The court stated:
If an additional First Amendment liberty-the freedom of the press-is
here involved, we do not hesitate to conclude that it too must give place
under the Constitution to a paramount public interest in the fair admin-
istration of justice. "The right to sue and defend in the courts is the
alternative of force. In an organized society it is the right conservative of
all other rights, and lies at the foundation of orderly government."
Id. at 549 (quoting Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907)).
'4 259 F.2d at 551. Accord Comment, Confidential Sources: The Yellow Brick
Road Does Not Lead to Florida, 13 STETSON L. REv. 462, 463-74 (1984) (discussing
Florida's refinement of Garland test).
w- 259 F.2d at 551.
147 Id.
"I Id. at 550.
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In Herbert v. Lando,149 the United States Supreme Court
considered the conflict between reputational interests and first
amendment guarantees in pretrial discovery requests. 50 Holding
that the plaintiff in a libel suit should be allowed complete
discovery within the limits of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure,' 5' the Court permitted inquiry into the editorial process. 15 2
Thus, according to some commentators, the Court impliedly
"held discovery of the editorial process to be consistent with the
first amendment."' 5 3 The Court's reasoning centered on the
plaintiff's need to prove the New York Times v. Sullivan'
5 4
standard for actual malice. 5 Since state of mind is a crucial
element in "public figure plaintiff" libel litigation, such plain-
tiffs naturally seek expanded discovery. 5 6 As the Court explained
in Lando:
Although defamation litigation, including suits against the press,
is an ancient phenomenon, it is true that our cases from New
York Times to Gertz have considerably changed the profile of
such cases. In years gone by, plaintiffs made out a prima facie
case by proving the damaging publication. Truth and privilege
were defenses. Intent, motive and malice were not necessarily
involved except to counter qualified privilege or to prove ex-
emplary damages. The plaintiff's burden is now considerably
expanded. In every or almost every case, the plaintiff must
focus on the editorial process and prove a false publication
attended by some degree of culpability on the part of the
publisher. If plaintiffs in consequence now resort to more
discovery, it would not be surprising.'
7
-' 441 U.S. 153 (1979). The case involved a "public figure plaintiff's" libel claim
against CBS, reporter Mike Wallace, and Barry Lando, the producer of "60 Minutes."
The plaintiff alleged that the story falsely and maliciously portrayed him as a liar. Id.
at 156.
'o Id. at 169-75. See Note, supra note 101, at 1026.
" The "broad and liberal treatment" of discovery by litigants in any civil trial
was extended to libel cases. 441 U.S. at 177 (citing Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S.
104, 114-15 (1964), and Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501, 507 (1947)).
112 441 U.S, at 175.
" Note, supra note 101, at 1030. See also 441 U.S. at 172.
114 376 U.S. 254.
"1 441 U.S. at 170.
1 Id. at 176.
117 Id. at 175-76. Of course, increased discovery creates the danger of a "chilling




As Lando indicated, expanded discovery has been a natural
progression of the actual malice requirement. Most courts, in
light of Branzburg, Garland, and Lando, have still "concluded
that a qualified privilege for a journalist to protect the identity
of a confidential source exists."' 5 8 Yet, the plaintiff may claim
that the identification of a source is required to prove the
defendant's negligence or reckless disregard for the truth; 59 the
source may help establish fault if she gave the defendant other
leads that he did not pursue, or if she later specifically contra-
dicted the statement. 16° The plaintiff may even claim that there
is no source.' 6' In such instances the plaintiff may force disclo-
sure of a confidential source by showing that disclosure is (1)
critical to his claim, and (2) that reasonable alternatives have
been explored without success.' 62 If the plaintiff is unable to
demonstrate a concrete need for the information, 6 and the
defendant can establish a good faith belief in the truth of his
statement, the court may refuse to order disclosure. 164
To prevent disclosure, the best and perhaps only protection
for a reporter is a statutory privilege, known commonly as a
shield law. Kentucky's shield law 161 protects only the source's
identity, and not the content of unpublished information. 166 Ab-
sent a shield law, however, a reporter's sources are discoverable
unless the court finds no real need for the information, 167 or a
rare common-law privilege exists.'68 The legislative decision to
provide such a privilege has been challenged in several jurisdic-
tions,' 69 and some challenges have been successful. Some courts




,' Id. Justice Brennan, in his partial dissent in Lando, analogized editorial privilege
to executive privilege and suggested that the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing
of defamatory falsehood before editorial privilege must yield. 441 U.S. at 197.
" See, e.g., 464 F.2d at 994.
Id. at 995.
KRS § 421.100.
Lexington Herald-Leader v. Beard, 690 S.W.2d at 375-76; 461 S.W.2d at 347.
See, e.g., 464 F.2d at 992-93; 259 F.2d at 549-50.
Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 641 P.2d 1180, 1183 (Wash. 1982).
See generally Goodale, Courts Begin Limiting Scope of Various Shield Laws, 1
NAT'L L.J. 28 (August 7, 1978).
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have narrowed broad shield laws to protect only sources,' 70 while
others have found that the privilege does not apply in criminal
cases.171
At this point, at least in Kentucky, the "Deep Throats" of
civil litigation are safe from discovery. 172 Beard represents a
proper balance between private reputational interests and the
constitutional guarantee of a free press. The approach is an
agreeable combination of constitutional, common, and statutory
law interpretation.
See, e.g., 461 S.W.2d at 347.
' In Re Farber, 394 A.2d 330, 337-39 (N.J.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978).
690 S.W.2d at 375-76. See generally, Comment, News Sources, supra note 124.
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